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Abstract. We investigate the complexity of the model checking problem for intuitionistic
and modal propositional logics over transitive Kripke models. More specific, we consider
intuitionistic logic IPC, basic propositional logic BPL, formal propositional logic FPL,
and Jankov’s logic KC. We show that the model checking problem is P-complete for the
implicational fragments of all these intuitionistic logics. For BPL and FPL we reach P-
hardness even on the implicational fragment with only one variable. The same hardness
results are obtained for the strictly implicational fragments of their modal companions.
Moreover, we investigate whether formulas with less variables and additional connectives
make model checking easier. Whereas for variable free formulas outside of the implicational
fragment, FPL model checking is shown to be in LOGCFL, the problem remains P-complete
for BPL.
1. Introduction
Intuitionistic propositional logic IPC (see e.g. [31]) goes back to Heyting and bases on
Brouwer’s idea of constructivism from the beginning of the 20th century. It can be seen as
the part of classical propositional logic that goes without the use of the excluded middle
a ∨ ¬a.
While it was originally conceived and is primarily of interest from a proof-theoretic point
of view, IPC admits many sound and complete semantics, such as the algebraic semantics
[29], the topological semantics [17], and the arithmetical semantics [7]. The most well known
semantics for IPC is Kripke’s possible world semantics [15]. As a matter of fact, already in
the 1930s it was observed by Go¨del that IPC can be mapped to a fragment of the modal
logic S4, which was later shown to be the modal logic of the class of transitive and reflexive
Kripke frames [14]. In this paper, we explore this Kripke semantics further.
Whereas the complexity of the validity problem for IPC is deeply studied [25, 28, 22, 12],
the exact complexity of its model checking problem is open. Research on the complexity
of model checking on Kripke models goes back to [10, 23] (where it is called determination
of truth) and has been done for a variety of logics like dynamic logic and many temporal
logics. It was recently shown that the model checking problem for IPC formulas with one
variable is AC1-complete [19]. We investigate the complexity of model checking for different
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intuitionistic logics and for related modal logics—their modal companions. Our central
question is which ingredients (i.e. logical connectives, number of variables) are needed in
order to obtain maximal hardness of the model checking problem.
We consider the intuitionistic logics BPL (basic propositional logic [32]), FPL (formal
propositional logic [32]), IPC and KC (Jankov’s logic, see [9]). All have semantics that is
defined over Kripke models with a monotone valuation function and a transitive frame1 (as
for BPL) that distinguish on whether the frame is additionally irreflexive (FPL), reflexive
(IPC), or a directed preorder (KC). The validity problem for all these logics is PSPACE-
complete [25, 4, 28], and the satisfiability problem is NP-complete for IPC and for KC,
but in NC1 for BPL and for FPL. These intuitionistic logics can be embedded into the
modal logics K4, PrL (provability logic [1, 26]), S4, and S4.2, that are called the modal
companions of the respective intuitionistic logic. The validity problem and the satisfiability
problem is PSPACE-complete for all these modal logics [16, 24]. The PSPACE-completeness
results mentioned also hold for the implicational fragment of intuitionistic logics [25, 4, 28]
resp. the strictly implicational fragment for the considered modal logics [2]. Also, the
complexity of the validity problem for fragments of the considered logics with a bounded
number of variables was investigated [27, 5, 22]. Roughly speaking, the number of variables
that is needed to obtain a PSPACE-hard validity problem depends on whether the semantics
restricts the transitive frames (of the Kripke models) to be reflexive, irreflexive, or none of
both. For intuitionistic logics, it is shown in [22] that on transitive and reflexive frames (IPC)
one needs two variables to reach PSPACE-hardness for the validity problem, on transitive
and irreflexive frames (FPL) one variable is necessary, and on arbitrary transitive frames
(BPL) one comes out without variables at all. For their modal companions, the same
bounds apply for transitive and irreflexive frames (PrL) [27] and for arbitrary transitive
frames (K4) [5], but for transitive and reflexive frames (S4) already one variable suffices [5].
Notice that no PSPACE-hardness results are known for the implicational fragment with a
bounded number of variables.
The model checking problem is the following decision problem. Given a formula, a
Kripke model, and a state in this model, decide whether the formula is satisfied in that
state. For classical propositional logic, the model checking problem (also called the formula
evaluation problem) can be solved in alternating logarithmic time [3]. Since the models for
classical propositional logic can be seen as a special case of Kripke models that consist of only
one state, we cannot expect such a low complexity for intuitionistic logics, where the models
may consist of many states. For the considered logics, the upper bound P follows from [10].
In fact, this upper bound turns out to be the lower bound too—we show that the model
checking problem for KC, IPC, BPL, and FPL is P-complete, even on the implicational
fragments. We obtain the same bounds on the number of variables for the P-hardness
of the model checking problem as for the PSPACE-hardness of the validity problem (see
above) for the considered intuitionistic logics and their modal companions. Other than for
the validity problem, we obtain P-hardness even on the implicational fragments of FPL and
BPL with one variable. The PSPACE-hardness of the validity problem on these fragments
is open. Since the implicational fragments of IPC and KC for any bounded number of
variables have only a finite number of equivalence classes (see [30]), we cannot expect to
get P-hardness of model checking on these fragments. We also consider optimality of the
P-hardness results in the sense whether model checking with less variables has complexity
1Unless otherwise stated we expect in the following every Kripke model to be transitive.
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below P. We show that model checking for the variable free fragment of FPL drops to
LOGCFL, whereas for BPL one can trade the variable in an ∨ and keeps P-hardness.
Our results base on a technique we use to show that the model checking problem for
the implicational fragment of IPC is P-hard. The variables we use in our construction are
essentially needed to measure distances in the model and to mark a certain state. In order
to restrict the use of variables, it suffices to express these in a different way. This takes
different numbers of variables in the different logics according to their frame properties.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notations for the
logics under consideration, and we show P-completeness of a graph accessibility problem for
a special case of alternating graphs that will be used for our P-hardness proofs. In Section 3
we consider model checking for the intuitionistic logics KC, IPC, FPL, and BPL. It starts
with the P-hardness results (Section 3.1), and closes with the optimality of bounds on the
number of variables needed to obtain P-hardness (Section 3.2). In Section 4 the results for
the modal companions S4.2, S4, PrL, and K4 follow. The arising completeness results and
conclusions are drawn in Section 5. An overview of the results is given in Figures 7 and 8.
2. Preliminaries
Kripke Models. We will consider different propositional logics whose formulas base on a
countable set PROP of propositional variables. A Kripke model is a triple M = (U,R, ξ),
where U is a nonempty and finite set of states, R is a binary relation on U , and ξ : PROP→
P(U) is a function—the valuation function. For any variable it assigns the set of states in
which this variable is satisfied. (U,R) can also be seen as a directed graph—it is called a
frame in this context. A frame (U,R) is reflexive, if (x, x) ∈ R for all x ∈ U , it is irreflexive,
if (x, x) /∈ R for all x ∈ U , and it is transitive, if for all a, b, c ∈ U , it follows from (a, b) ∈ R
and (b, c) ∈ R that (a, c) ∈ R. A reflexive and transitive frame is called a preorder. If a
preorder (U,R) has the additional property that for all a, b ∈ U there exists a c ∈ U with
(a, c) ∈ R and (b, c) ∈ R, then (U,R) is called a directed preorder.
Modal Propositional Logic. The language ML of modal logic is the set of all formulas
of the form
ϕ ::= ⊥ | p | ϕ→ ϕ | ✷ϕ ,
where p ∈ PROP. As usual, we use the abbreviations ¬ϕ := ϕ → ⊥, ⊤ := ¬⊥, ϕ ∨ ψ :=
(¬ϕ)→ ψ, ϕ ∧ ψ := ¬(ϕ→ ¬ψ), and ✸ϕ := ¬✷¬ϕ.
The semantics is defined via Kripke models. Given a Kripke model M = (U,R, ξ) and
a state s ∈ U , the satisfaction relation for modal logics |=m is defined as follows.
M, s 6|=m ⊥
M, s |=m p iff s ∈ ξ(p), p ∈ PROP,
M, s |=m ϕ→ ψ iff M, s 6|=m ϕ or M, s |=m ψ,
M, s |=m ✷ϕ iff ∀t ∈ U with (s, t) ∈ R :M, t |=m ϕ.
For M, s |=m ϕ we say that formula ϕ is satisfied by model M in state s.
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The modal logic defined in this way is called K and it is the weakest normal modal
logic. We will consider the stronger modal logics K4, S4, S4.2, and PrL. The formulas in
all these logics are the same as for ML. Since we are interested in model checking, we use
the semantics defined by Kripke models. They will be defined by properties of the frame
(U,R) that is part of the model. The semantics of K4 is defined by transitive frames. This
means, that a formula α is a theorem of K4 if and only ifM, w |=m α for all Kripke models
M whose frame is transitive and all states w of M. The semantics of S4 is defined by
preorders, of S4.2 by directed preorders, and of PrL by transitive and irreflexive frames.
Intuitionistic Propositional Logic. The language IL of intuitionistic logic is essentially
the same as that of classical propositional logic, i.e. it is the set of all formulas of the form
ϕ ::= ⊥ | p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ _ ϕ ,
where p ∈ PROP. As usual, we use the abbreviations ¬ϕ := ϕ _ ⊥ and ⊤ := ¬⊥. Because
of the semantics of intuitionistic logic, one cannot express ∧ or ∨ using implication and ⊥.
Therefore we use _ instead of →.
The semantics is defined via Kripke modelsM = (U, ⊳ , ξ) that fulfil certain restrictions.
Firstly, ⊳ is transitive, and secondly, the valuation function ξ : PROP→ P(U) is monotone
in the sense that for every p ∈ PROP, a, b ∈ U : if a ∈ ξ(p) and a ⊳ b, then b ∈ ξ(p).
We will call models that fulfil both these properties intuitionistic or model for BPL. An
intuitionistic model M = (U, ⊳, ξ) where ⊳ is additionally reflexive (i.e. ⊳ is a preorder) is
called a model for IPC. If ⊳ is a directed preorder, then M is called a model for KC, and
if ⊳ is irreflexive, M is called a model for FPL.
Given an intuitionistic modelM = (U, ⊳ , ξ) and a state s ∈ U , the satisfaction relation
for intuitionistic logics |=i is defined as follows.
M, s 6|=i ⊥
M, s |=i p iff s ∈ ξ(p), p ∈ PROP,
M, s |=i ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s |=i ϕ and M, s |=i ψ,
M, s |=i ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, s |=i ϕ or M, s |=i ψ,
M, s |=i ϕ _ ψ iff ∀n ∈ U with s ⊳ n : if M, n |=i ϕ then M, n |=i ψ
An important property of intuitionistic logic is that the monotonicity property of the valua-
tion function also holds for all formulas ϕ: ifM, s |=i ϕ then ∀n with s⊳n holdsM, n |=i ϕ.
A formula ϕ is satisfied by an intuitionistic modelM in state s if and only ifM, s |=i ϕ.
Basic propositional logic BPL [32] (resp. IPC, KC, FPL [32]) is the set of IL-formulas that
are satisfied by every model for BPL (resp. IPC, KC, FPL) in every state.
Modal Companions. Go¨del-Tarski translations map intuitionistic formulas to modal for-
mulas in a way that preserves validity in the different logics. We take the translation 1 from
[32], that we call gt and that is defined as follows.
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intuitionistic logic modal companion frame properties
BPL K4 transitive
IPC S4 transitive and reflexive (= preorder)
KC S4.2 directed preorder
FPL PrL transitive and irreflexive
Figure 1: Intuitionistic logics, their modal companions, and the common frame properties.
gt(⊥) := ⊥
gt(p) := p ∧ ✷p (for all p ∈ PROP)
gt(α ∧ β) := gt(α) ∧ gt(β)
gt(α ∨ β) := gt(α) ∨ gt(β)
gt(α _ β) := ✷(gt(α)→ gt(β))
Visser [32] showed that α is valid in FPL if and only if gt(α) is valid in PrL. Therefore,
PrL is called modal companion of FPL. It is straightforward to see that gt can also be used
to show that K4 (resp. S4, S4.2) is a modal companion of BPL (resp. IPC, KC). Figure 1
gives an overview of the intuitionistic logics and their modal companions used here.
Model Checking Problems. This paper examines the model checking problems L-KMc
for logics L whose formulas are evaluated on Kripke models with different properties.
Problem: L-KMc
Input: 〈ϕ,M, s〉, where
ϕ is a formula for L,M = (U,R, ξ) is a Kripke model for L, and s ∈ U
Question: Is ϕ satisfied by M in state s?
We assume that formulas and Kripke models are encoded in a straightforward way. This
means, a formula is given as a text, and the graph (U,R) of a Kripke model is given by
its adjacency matrix that takes |U |2 bits. Therefore, only finite Kripke models can be
considered and it can be easily decided whether the model has the order property for the
logic under consideration.
Complexity. We assume familiarity with the standard notions of complexity theory as,
e. g., defined in [20]. The complexity classes we use in this paper are P (polynomial time)
and some of its subclasses. LOGCFL is the class of sets that are logspace many-one reducible
to context-free languages. It is also characterized as sets decidable by a nondeterministic
Turing machine in polynomial time and logarithmic space with additional use of a stack.
L denotes logspace, and NL nondeterministic logspace. To round off the picture, NC1 (=
alternating logarithmic time) is the class for which the model checking problem for classical
propositional logic is complete [3], and the model checking problem for IPC1 is complete
for AC1 (= alternating logspace with logarithmically bounded number of alternations) [19].
The inclusion structure of the classes under consideration is as follows.
NC
1 ⊆ L ⊆ NL ⊆ LOGCFL ⊆ AC1 ⊆ P
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Fisher and Ladner [10] showed that model checking for modal logic is in P.
Theorem 2.1. [10] K-KMc is in P.
The notion of reducibility we apply is the logspace many-one reduction ≤logm . The Go¨del-
Tarski translation gt can be seen as such a reduction between the model checking problems
for intuitionistic logics and their modal companions, namely BPL-KMc ≤logm K4-KMc,
IPC-KMc ≤logm S4-KMc, KC-KMc ≤
log
m S4.2-KMc, and FPL-KMc ≤
log
m PrL-KMc. Since gt
does not introduce additional variables, the respective reducibilities also hold for the model
checking problems for formulas with any restricted number of variables. It therefore follows
from Theorem 2.1 that P is an upper bound for all model checking problems for modal
respectively intuitionistic logics considered in this paper.
Fragments of Logics. We consider fragments with bounded number of variables or _
as only connective. The implicational formulas are the formulas with _ and ⊥ as only
connectives. For an intuitionistic logic L, we use L_ to denote the implicational formulas
of L, i.e. its implicational fragment. Li denotes its fragment with i variables, i.e. the formulas
of L with at most i variables. L_i denotes the implicational fragment with i variables. For
modal logics, the (strictly) implicational fragment consists of formulas of the form
ϕ ::= ⊥ | p | ✷(ϕ→ ϕ) .
We use the same notation for implicational fragments of modal logics (resp. with bounded
numbers of variables) as for intuitionistic logics.
The Go¨del-Tarski translation gt does not translate formulas of the implicational frag-
ment of intuitionistic logics into the strictly implicational fragment of modal logics. For the
model checking problem, we can use a different translation that preserves satisfaction but
does not preserve validity. Let gt ′ be the translation that is the same as gt but gt ′(p) = p
for every variable p.
Lemma 2.2. Let α be an IL-formula, and M be an intuitionistic model with state s. Then
M, s |=i α if and only if M, s |=m gt
′(α). If α is an implicational formula, then gt ′(α) is
strictly implicational.
P-complete Problems. Chandra, Kozen, and Stockmeyer [6] have shown that the Al-
ternating Graph Accessibility Problem Agap is P-complete. In [11] it is mentioned that
P-completeness also holds for a bipartite version.
An alternating graph G = (V,E) is a bipartite directed graph where V = V∃ ∪ V∀ are
the partitions of V . Nodes in V∃ are called existential nodes, and nodes in V∀ are called
universal nodes. The property apathG(x, y) for nodes x, y ∈ V expresses that there exists
an alternating path through G from node x to node y, and it is defined as follows.
1) apathG(x, x) holds for all x ∈ V
2a) for x ∈ V∃: apathG(x, y) if and only if ∃z ∈ V∀ : (x, z) ∈ E and apathG(z, y)
2b) for x ∈ V∀: apathG(x, y) if and only if ∀z ∈ V∃ : if (x, z) ∈ E then apathG(z, y)
The problem Agap consists of directed bipartite graphs G and nodes s, t that satisfy the
property apathG(s, t). Notice that in bipartite graphs existential and universal nodes are
strictly alternating.
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Problem: Agap
Input: 〈G, s, t〉, where G is a directed bipartite graph
Question: does apathG(s, t) hold?
Theorem 2.3. [6, 11] Agap is P-complete.
For our purposes, we need an even more restricted variant of Agap. We require that
the graph is sliced. An alternating slice graph G = (V,E) is a directed bipartite acyclic
graph with a bipartitioning V = V∃ ∪ V∀, and a further partitioning V = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ · · · ∪ Vm
(m slices, Vi ∩ Vj = ∅ if i 6= j) where
V∃ =
⋃
i≤m,i odd
Vi,
V∀ =
⋃
i≤m,i even
Vi, and
E ⊆
⋃
i=1,2,...,m−1
Vi × Vi+1, i.e. all edges go from slice Vi to slice Vi+1.
Finally, we require that all nodes in a slice graph excepted those in the last slice Vm have
outdegree > 0.
Problem: AsAgap
Input: 〈G, s, t〉, where G = (V∃∪V∀, E) is a slice graph with slices V1, . . . , Vm,
and s ∈ V1 ∩ V∃, t ∈ Vm ∩ V∀
Question: does apathG(s, t) hold?
It is not hard to see that this version of the alternating graph accessibility problem remains
P-complete.
Lemma 2.4. AsAgap is P-complete.
Proof sketch. AsAgap is in P, since it is a special case of Agap. In order to show P-
hardness of AsAgap, it suffices to find a reduction Agap ≤logm AsAgap. For an instance
〈G, s, t〉 of Agap with graph G = (V.E) where V = V∃ ∪ V∀ has n nodes, we construct an
alternating slice graph G′ = (V ′, E′) with m = 2n slices as follows. Let V ′i = {〈v, i〉 | v ∈ V }
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, V ′∃ =
⋃
i odd V
′
i , and V
′
∀ =
⋃
i even V
′
i . The edges outgoing from a slice Vi for
odd i < n (existential slice) are
E′i =
{(
〈u, i〉, 〈v, i+1〉
) ∣∣∣ (u, v) ∈ E and u ∈ V∃−{t}}∪{(〈u, i〉, 〈u, i+1〉) ∣∣∣ u ∈ V∀ ∪ {t}}
and for even i (universal slice) accordingly
E′i =
{(
〈u, i〉, 〈v, i+1〉
) ∣∣∣ (u, v) ∈ E and u ∈ V∀−{t}}∪{(〈u, i〉, 〈u, i+1〉) ∣∣∣ u ∈ V∃∪{t}} .
Then G′ = (V ′∃ ∪ V
′
∀, E
′
1 ∪ · · · ∪ E
′
m−1). The transformation from G to G
′ can be com-
puted in logarithmic space. It is not hard to see that 〈G, s, t〉 ∈ Agap if and only if
〈G′, 〈s, 1〉, 〈t,m〉〉 ∈ AsAgap.
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Our basic P-hardness proofs of model checking problems will use logspace reductions
fromAsAgap. The structural basis can be seen in the proof of the folklore result about K0—
the fragment of modal logic without variables—that we extend to the strictly implicational
fragment K→0 .
Theorem 2.5. The model checking problem for K→0 is P-hard.
Proof. First, we give a straightforward transformation from AsAgap to K0-KMc. Second,
we turn this into a reduction from AsAgap to K→0 -KMc.
Let 〈G, s, t〉 be an instance of AsAgap, where G = (V,E) is a slice graph with m slices.
We construct the modelMG := (V,E∪{(t, t)}, ξ) and the formula ϕG := ✸✷✸ · · ·✷✸(✸⊤)
that consists of a sequence of m − 1 alternating modal operators starting with ✸ that is
followed by ✸⊤. Notice that t is the only state in Vm that has a successor, and therefore
it is the only state in Vm where ✸⊤ is satisfied. Intuitively speaking, the prefix of ✸⊤ in
ϕG that consists of alternating modal operators simulates the alternating path through G
from s, and eventually ✸⊤ is satisfied on all the endpoints of this alternating path only
if all endpoints equal t. It is not hard to see that an alternating path from s to t exists
in G if and only if MG, s |=m ϕG, i.e. 〈G, s, t〉 ∈ AsAgap if and only if MG, s |=m ϕG.
Accordingly, 〈G, s, t〉 ∈ AsAgap if and only ifMG, s |=m ¬ϕG, where AsAgap denotes the
complement of AsAgap.
We now transform ¬ϕG into an equivalent formula in the strictly implicational frag-
ment. Using duality of ✸ and ✷ we obtain that ¬✸✷✸ · · ·✷✸(✸⊤) is equivalent to
✷¬✷¬✷ · · · ¬✷¬✷(✷⊥). Every subformula ✷¬α is equivalent to ✷(α → ⊥), and the fi-
nal ✷(✷⊥) is equivalent to ✷(⊤ → ✷(⊤ → ⊥)), where ⊤ ≡ ✷(⊥ → ⊥). In this way, ¬ϕG
can be transformed into the equivalent formula ϕ′G that belongs to the strictly implicational
fragment. It is straightforward that the mapping 〈G, s, t〉 7→ 〈ϕ′G,MG, s〉 can be computed
in logarithmic space. Since ϕ′G contains no variables and belongs to the strictly implicational
fragment, this yields AsAgap ≤logm K→0 -KMc, and the P-hardness of K
→
0 -KMc follows from
the P-completeness of AsAgap (Lemma 2.4) and the closure of P under complement.
In general, the slice graph is transformed into a frame (of a Kripke model) to be used
in an instance of the model checking problem. Since the semantics of the logics under
consideration is defined by Kripke models with frames that are transitive (and reflexive),
we need to produce frames that are transitive (and reflexive). The straightforward way
would be to take the transitive closure of a slice graph. But this cannot be computed
with the resources that are allowed for our reduction functions, i.e. in logarithmic space.
Fortunately, slice graphs can easily be made transitive by adding all edges that “jump”
from a node to a node that is at least two slices higher. Clearly, the resulting graph is
a transitive supergraph of the transitive closure of the slice graph. In order to make the
reductions from AsAgap to the model checking problems work, the valuation function of
the Kripke model and the formula that has to be evaluated have to be constructed in a way
that “ignores” these edges that jump over a slice.
Definition 2.6. Let V≥i =
⋃
j=i,i+1,...,m Vj , and V≤i =
⋃
j=1,2,...,i Vj . The pseudo-transitive
closure of a slice graph G = (V,E) with m slices V = V1∪· · ·∪Vm is the graph G
′ = (V,E′)
where
E′ := E ∪
⋃
i=1,2,...,m−2
(
Vi × V≥i+2
)
.
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s
t
s
t
Figure 2: A slice graph and its pseudo-transitive closure
The reflexive and pseudo-transitive closure of the slice graph G is the graph G′′ = (V,E′′)
where
E′′ := E′ ∪ {(u, u) | u ∈ V } .
An example for a slice graph and its pseudo-transitive closure is shown in Figure 2.
3. Lower bounds for intuitionistic logics
We investigate the complexity of the model checking problem for fragments of the intu-
itionistic logics KC, IPC, FPL, and BPL in Section 3.1. Our basic proof idea is presented
in the proof of Theorem 3.1 where we show the P-hardness of KC_-KMc. This hardness
result carries directly over to IPC_-KMc and BPL_-KMc. In order to obtain results for
fragments with a restricted number of variables we extend the construction from the basic
proof. In a first step, we show the P-hardness of model checking for FPL_ even if we
consider formulas with only one variable, i.e. FPL_1 -KMc. The same proof works for the
P-hardness of BPL_1 -KMc. In a second step, we yield P-hardness of BPL0-KMc. Notice
that it remains open whether BPL_0 -KMc is P-hard, too. Our last P-hardness result in
Section 3.1 shows that KC2-KMc and IPC2-KMc are P-hard. In Section 3.2 we show that
the results for FPL_1 -KMc, KC2-KMc, and IPC2-KMc are optimal in the sense, that with
one variable less the model checking problem cannot be P-hard, unless unexpected collapses
of complexity classes happen.
3.1. P-hard fragments.
We present the basic construction in the proof of Theorem 3.1, where we show the P-
hardness of the model checking problem for the implicational fragment of KC. For this,
we use a logspace reduction from AsAgap to KC_-KMc. The P-hardness of the model
checking problems for the implicational fragments of IPC and BPL follow straightforwardly.
Theorem 3.1. The model checking problem for KC_ is P-hard.
Proof. We show AsAgap ≤logm KC
_-KMc. The result then follows from Lemma 2.4.
Let 〈G, s, t〉 be an instance of AsAgap. We show how to construct a model MG and
a formula ψG such that 〈G, s, t〉 ∈ AsAgap if and only if MG, s |=i ψG. Let the slice
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graph G = (V, E) have m slices, with V = V∃ ∪ V∀, and V∃ = V1 ∪ V3 ∪ · · · ∪ Vm−1, and
V∀ = V2 ∪ V4 ∪ · · · ∪ Vm. We use V≥i to denote
⋃
j≥i Vj .
In order to use G as a frame of a model for KC, it must be a directed preorder. To get
(V,6) we build the pseudo-transitive closure of G, add the slice Vm+1 := {top}, add edges
from every node in V to top, and build the reflexive closure. It is clear that (V,6) can be
computed from G in logarithmic space. For simplicity of notation we write x < y or y > x
for x 6 y and x 6= y, and we also use x > y and x > y in the same way. The variables
that we will use in our formulas are a1, . . . , am+1. Informally, ai is satisfied in the states of
the slices Vi+1, . . . , Vm+1, further am is satisfied in the goal node t, and am+1 is satisfied in
top. Define the valuation function ξ by ξ(ai) := Vi+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vm+1 (for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1),
ξ(am) := {t, top}, and ξ(am+1) := {top}. The Kripke model MG = (V,6, ξ) is a model
that satisfies the requirements for KC.
s
t
∃
∀
∃
∀
Graph G s
t
top slice V5: a1, a2, a3, a4, a5
slice V4: a1, a2, a3
slice V3: a1, a2
slice V2: a1
slice V1: no variable is satisfied
a4
Kripke model MG
Figure 3: A slice graph G, and the model MG as constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
The edges to the top node are not drawn, reflexive edges are not drawn, and the
pseudo-transitive edges are drawn dashed. The valuation marks the nodes (resp.
the slices). The fat edges indicate that apathG(s, t) holds.
Figure 3 shows a slice graph G with m = 4 slices and the Kripke model MG that is
transformed from it. We will use the formulas ψ1, . . . , ψm in order to express the apathG
property on MG.
ψm := am _ am+1
ψj := ψj+1 _ aj for j = m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1
Next we will show that satisfaction of ψi in slice Vi depends only on the edges of the graph
G and not on the reflexive and pseudo-transitive edges that were added in order to obtain
the Kripke structure.
Claim 1. For all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1 the following holds.
(1) For all w ∈ V≥i+1 holds MG, w |=i ψi.
(2) For all w ∈ Vi holds MG, w |=i ψi if and only if MG, w 6|=i ψi+1.
(3) For all w ∈ Vi holds MG, w |=i ψi if and only if ∃u > w, u ∈ Vi+1 :MG, u 6|=i ψi+1.
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Proof of Claim. For part (1), notice that ψi = (· · · ((am _ am+1) _ am−1) _ · · · _
ai+1) _ ai. Since ξ(ai) = V≥i+1, the right-hand side of ψi is satisfied in all states in V>i.
Therefore ψi is satisfied in all states in V≥i, too.
Part (2) expresses that ψi and ψi+1 behave like the mutual complement in slice Vi, and
is shown as follows. Let w ∈ Vi.
MG, w |=i ψi
⇔ ∀v > w : if MG, v |=i ψi+1 then MG, v |=i ai (semantics of _)
⇔ if MG, w |=i ψi+1 then MG, w |=i ai (since ξ(ai) = V>i)
⇔ MG, w 6|=i ψi+1 (since MG, w 6|=i ai)
Part (3) can be proven by proving MG, w 6|=i ψi+1 if and only if ∃u > w, u ∈ Vi+1 :
MG, u 6|=i ψi+1, according to (2). The direction from right to left follows immediately
from part (1) and the monotonicity of intuitionistic logic. For the other direction, assume
∀u > w, u ∈ Vi+1 : MG, u |=i ψi+1. Firstly, this yields ∀u > w : if MG, u |=i ψi+2 then
MG, u |=i ai+1 (∗∗), and secondly ∀u > w, u ∈ Vi+1 : MG, u 6|=i ψi+2 (by (2)). From the
latter, it follows by the monotonicity property of intuitionistic logic that MG, w 6|=i ψi+2.
Notice that MG, w 6|=i ai+1 by construction of ξ, and therefore we have: if MG, w |=i ψi+2
then MG, w |=i ai+1. Together with (∗∗) follows ∀u > w : if MG, u |=i ψi+2 then MG, u |=i
ai+1. This means MG, w |=i ψi+1.
It is our goal to show that ψ1 is satisfied in state s ∈ V1 if and only if graph G has an
alternating s-t-path, i.e. apathG(s, t). We do this stepwise.
Claim 2. For all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and all w ∈ Vi holds:
(1) if i is odd: apathG(w, t) if and only if MG, w |=i ψi, and
(2) if i is even: apathG(w, t) if and only if MG, w 6|=i ψi.
Proof of Claim. We prove the claim by induction on i. The base case i = m considers an
even i. Let w ∈ Vm. The following equivalences are straightforward.
apathG(w, t)
⇔ w = t
⇔ MG, w 6|=i am _ am+1 (= ψm)
For the induction step, consider i < m. First, assume that i is odd. Then the slice Vi
consists of existential nodes. Let w ∈ Vi.
apathG(w, t)
⇔ ∃u, (w, u) ∈ E : apathG(u, t) (definition of apathG)
⇔ ∃u > w, u ∈ Vi+1 :MG, u 6|=i ψi+1 (induction hypothesis, construction of MG)
⇔ MG, w |=i ψi (Claim 1(3))
Second, assume that i is even. Then the slice Vi consists of universal nodes. Let w ∈ Vi.
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apathG(w, t)
⇔ ∀u, (w, u) ∈ E : apathG(u, t) (definition of apathG)
⇔ ∀u > w, u ∈ Vi+1 :MG, u |=i ψi+1 (induction hypothesis, construction of MG)
⇔ MG, w 6|=i ψi (Claim 1(3))
Let ψG := ψ1. From Claim 2 it now follows that 〈G, s, t〉 ∈ AsAgap if and only if
MG, s |=i ψG, i.e. 〈ψG,MG, s〉 ∈ KC
_-KMc. Since MG and ψG can be constructed from
G using logarithmic space, it follows that AsAgap ≤logm KC
_-KMc.
Clearly, the same lower bound holds for the implicational fragments of IPC and BPL.
Corollary 3.2. The model checking problem for IPC_ and BPL_ is P-hard.
The basic construction of the reduction from the above proof can be seen as follows. The
frame of the model contains all information about the AsAgap instance from which it is
constructed, but there is some “noise” by the pseudo-transitive (and reflexive) edges. The
valuation function gives additional information on the structure of the AsAgap instance.
It says where the goal node t sits, and it allows to check the distances of any state to the
upper most slice. The formula puts both parts together. It uses the variables to filter out
the original AsAgap instance and to evaluate it.
If we restrict the number of variables to be used in the formula, we need a different
approach to measure the distances of the states to the upper most slice. For irreflexive
frames, we can replace the variables by formulas that measure this distance. To distinguish
the goal node from the other nodes we use one variable. This yields that FPL_1 -KMc is P-
hard (Theorem 3.3). In Theorem 3.7 we show that we cannot save this variable. Essentially,
in the fragment of FPL without variables we can measure distances, but we cannot do more.
Theorem 3.3. The model checking problem for FPL_1 is P-hard.
Proof. We show AsAgap ≤logm FPL
_
1 -KMc, where AsAgap is the complement of AsAgap.
Since P is closed under complement, from Lemma 2.4 follows that AsAgap is P-complete.
Therefore we obtain the P-hardness of FPL_1 -KMc.
Let 〈G, s, t〉 with G = (V,E) be an instance of AsAgap with m slices. From that
we construct an FPL_1 -KMc instance 〈ψ,M, s〉. Let p be the variable that is used in
FPL_1 . Let (V,≺) be the pseudo-transitive closure of G (see Definition 2.6). We define
M := (V,≺, ξ) with ξ(p) := {t}. We use p to distinguish t from the other states in slice
Vm. Figure 4 shows an example of M with m = 4.
To express the apathG property we use the formulas ψm, ψm−1, . . . , ψ1 defined as follows.
αm := ⊥, ψm := p
αi := ⊤ _ αi+1, ψi := ψi+1 _ αi+1 for i = m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1
Note that the length of ψ1 is approximately the sum of the lengths of all αi with m ≥ i > 1,
hence it is about m2. We use the αi formulas as yardsticks for the slices and the ψi formulas
for the alternation as we did in the proof of Theorem 3.1. According to Claim 1 we give the
following claim. Because of the irreflexivity of M we do not need the mutual complement
property (Claim 1(2)).
Claim 3. For all i with m ≥ i ≥ 2 it holds that
INTUITIONISTIC IMPLICATION MAKES MODEL CHECKING HARD 13
(1) M, w |=i αi if and only if w ∈ V≥i+1, and
(2) for all w ∈ Vi−1 it holds that M, w 6|=i ψi−1 if and only if ∃v ∈ Vi, w ≺ v :M, v |=i ψi.
Proof of Claim. With induction on i we show (1). For i = m it is trivial because αm = ⊥.
For the induction step let w ∈W and m > i ≥ 2.
M, w |=i αi (= ⊤ _ αi+1)
⇔ ∀v ∈ V,w ≺ v :M, v |=i αi+1 (semantics of _)
⇔ ∀v ∈ V,w ≺ v : v ∈ V≥i+2 (induction hypothesis)
⇔ w ∈ V≥i+1 (construction of M)
For (2) consider w ∈ Vi−1 with m ≥ i ≥ 2.
M, w 6|=i ψi−1 (= ψi _ αi)
⇔ ∃v ∈ V,w ≺ v :M, v |=i ψi and M, v 6|=i αi (semantics of _)
⇔ ∃v ∈ Vi, w ≺ v :M, v |=i ψi (Claim 3(1))
According to Claim 2 we have a similar connection between apathG and the ψi formulas.
Claim 4. For all i = m,m− 1, . . . , 1 and all w ∈ Vi it holds that:
(1) if i is even: apathG(w, t) if and only if M, w |=i ψi, and
(2) if i is odd: apathG(w, t) if and only if M, w 6|=i ψi.
Proof of Claim. We prove this claim by induction on i. The base case i = m considers an
even i. Let w ∈ Vm. The following equivalences are straightforward.
apathG(w, t)
⇔ w = t
⇔ M, w |=i p
The induction step is with the help of Claim 3 similar to the induction step in the proof of
Claim 2. (Note that the roles of the even and odd slices are swapped.) We consider i < m.
First, assume that i is even. Then the slice Vi consists of universal nodes. Let w ∈ Vi.
apathG(w, t)
⇔ ∀v ∈ V, (w, v) ∈ E : apathG(v, t) (definition of apathG)
⇔ ∀v ∈ Vi+1, w ≺ v :M, v 6|=i ψi+1 (induction hypothesis, construction of M)
⇔ M, w |=i ψi (Claim 3(2))
Second, assume that i is odd, then the slice Vi consists of existential nodes. Let w ∈ Vi.
apathG(w, t)
⇔ ∃v ∈ V, (w, v) ∈ E : apathG(v, t) (definition of apathG)
⇔ ∃v ∈ Vi+1, w ≺ v :M, v |=i ψi+1 (induction hypothesis, construction of M)
⇔ M, w 6|=i ψi (Claim 3(2))
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s
t
p t |=i p
u 6|=i p for u 6= t
g 6|=i p _ ⊥ for g with apathG(g, t)
u |=i p _ ⊥ for u with not apathG(u, t)
g |=i (p _ ⊥) _ (⊤ _ ⊥) for g with apathG(g, t)
u 6|=i (p _ ⊥) _ (⊤ _ ⊥) for u with not apathG(u, t)
s 6|=i ((p _ ⊥) _ (⊤ _ ⊥)) _ (⊤ _ (⊤ _ ⊥))
Figure 4: The model M as constructed from the example instance of AsAgap in Fig. 3
by the proof of Theorem 3.3. For simplicity, the pseudo-transitive edges are not
drawn.
Let ψ := ψ1. It follows from Claim 4 thatM, s |=i ψ (resp. 〈ψ,M, s〉 ∈ FPL
_
1 -KMc) if
and only if 〈G, s, t〉 /∈ AsAgap. SinceM and ψ can be constructed fromG using logarithmic
space, it follows that AsAgap ≤logm FPL
_
1 -KMc.
Corollary 3.4. The model checking problem for BPL_1 is P-hard.
For the fragment of BPL without variables, we can show the P-hardness of model
checking only for formulas with the connectives _ and ∨. Our replacement technique for
the last variable costs us the implicationality of the fragment.
Theorem 3.5. The model checking problem for BPL0 is P-hard.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.3 we show AsAgap ≤logm BPL0-KMc. The proof
consists of two parts. In the first part we modify the construction that we gave in the
proof of Theorem 3.3 in a way that the ψi formulas contain two variables but no ⊥ because
we need ⊥-free formulas for the second step. In the second step we use a technique from
Rybakov [22, Lemma 8] to substitute the variables.
Let 〈G, s, t〉 with G = (V,E) be an instance from AsAgap, (V,≺) be the pseudo-
transitive closure of G, and M := (V,≺, ξ) with ξ(p1) := {t} and ξ(p2) := ∅. Informally,
p2 plays the role of ⊥ because for all w ∈ V it holds that M, w 6|=i p2. We define the ψi
formulas as mentioned above.
θm := p2, ψm := p1
θi := ⊤ _ θi+1, ψi := ψi+1 _ θi+1 for i = m− 1,m− 2 . . . , 1
For the same reason as in the proof of Theorem 3.3 it holds that
M, s |=i ψ1 ⇔ 〈G, s, t〉 /∈ AsAgap.
The models Fi = (Wi, Ri) for i = 1, 2, 3 and the formulas β1 and β2 are defined as in the
proof of Lemma 8 in [22]. Let for k = 1, 2, 3
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a1
3
a1
2
a1
1
b1
|=i α3 _ α2
6|=i (α2 _ α1) ∨ α3
F1
a2
4
a2
3
a2
2
a2
1
b2
|=i α4 _ α3
6|=i (α3 _ α2) ∨ α4
F2
a3
5
a3
4
a3
3
a3
2
a3
1
b3
6|=i α4 _ α3
6|=i α3 _ α2
F3
Figure 5: The models F1, F2, and F3. (Transitive edges are not depicted.) It is drawn which
parts of β1 and β2 are satisfied and which are not. For example let w ∈W
∗ with
(w, a13) ∈ R
∗, then it holds that F∗, w 6|=i β1. Therefore we connect via R
∗ (resp.
Rξ) every state from V \ξ(p) with a13 and replace p1 with β1 in ψ1. The models F1
and F2 simulate ξ with technical help of F3. (For details see the proof of Lemma
8 in [22].)
Wk :=
{
bk, a
k
1 , a
k
2 , . . . , a
k
k+2
}
, and
Rk :=
{
(bk, bk), (a
k
k+2, bk)
}
∪
{
(aki , a
k
j ) | 1 ≤ j < i ≤ k + 2
}
.
The models are depicted in Figure 5. The formulas β1 and β2 are defined as follows. We
use the abbreviation α1 := ⊤ _ ⊥ and αi+1 := ⊤ _ αi for i ≥ 1.
β1 := (α3 _ α2) _ ((α2 _ α1) ∨ α3)
β2 := (α4 _ α3) _ ((α3 _ α2) ∨ α4)
We define a BPL0-KMc-instance 〈ψβ ,F
∗, s〉 with F∗ = (W ∗, R∗).
W ∗ := V ∪W1 ∪W2 ∪W3
Rξ :=
{
(w, a13), (v, a
2
4), (v, a
3
5) | w ∈W \ {t} , v ∈W
}
R∗ is the transitive closure of ≺ ∪ R1 ∪R2 ∪R3 ∪R
ξ
Note that |W1 ∪W2 ∪W3| = 15 and ≺ is already transitive, hence one can compute the
transitive closure in logarithmic space. (We give no valuation function because in BPL0
models variables are irrelevant.) The connection between β1 and β2 and F
∗ is shown and
explained in Figure 5. In the following we substitute the variables in ψ1.
ψβ := ψ1[p1/β1][p2/β2]
As Rybakov did in the proof of Lemma 8 in [22] one can show by induction on the con-
struction of ψ that
F∗, s |=i ψβ ⇔ M, s |=i ψ1.
16 M. MUNDHENK AND F .WEISS
(Note that Rybakov shows this only for ⊥-free formulas, hence we cannot use the one
variable version of ψ1 from the proof of Theorem 3.3.) It holds that 〈ψβ ,F
∗, s〉 ∈ BPL0-KMc
if and only if 〈G, s, t〉 /∈ AsAgap. It follows directly from the construction that this is a
logspace reduction.
Other than BPL_0 and FPL
_
0 , the implicational fragments of IPC with any bounded
number of variables have only a finite number of equivalence classes (see [30]). Therefore
they cannot express arbitrary distances in a model. We obtain P-hardness of model check-
ing for the fragment of IPC with two variables, where the formulas consist of arbitrary
connectives. The same applies for the fragment of KC with two variables.
The proof uses our basic construction from the proof of Theorem 3.1 and essentially the
same replacement of variables as in the proof of [22, Theorem 4] showing that the validity
problem for IPC2 is PSPACE-complete. Whereas there the reduction works in polynomial-
time (that suffices to compute transitive closures), our construction must be computable
in logarithmic space, and therefore we must deal with the pseudo-transitive closure. Little
other technical changes in the proof are needed. For completeness, we present the proof in
Appendix A.
Theorem 3.6. The model checking problem for KC2 and for IPC2 is P-hard.
3.2. Optimality of the bounds of the numbers of variables.
The P-hardness of KC2-KMc and IPC2-KMc (Theorem 3.6) is optimal because KC1-KMc ∈
NC1 and IPC1-KMc ∈ AC
1 [19]. In order to show the optimality of the P-hardness of
FPL_1 -KMc (Theorem 3.3), we show that the complexity of FPL0-KMc is below P.
Theorem 3.7. The model checking problem for FPL0 is in LOGCFL.
Proof. Visser [32] gives a systematically construction of representatives of the formula equiv-
alence classes of variable free formulas over irreflexive Kripke models. This enables that
every variable free formula can be represented by a small string. We call this string formula
index. We will show that every state in an FPL0 model can also be represented by the
length of its longest outgoing path. It turns out, that a formula is satisfied in a state if and
only if the formula index is greater than the length of the longest path that starts in the
state. This yields a LOGCFL algorithm for the model checking problem for FPL0.
The formula index of a formula is the index i of the FPL0-equivalent
2 formula αi from
[32, Def. 4.3] defined as follows. Let i ∈ N ∪ {ω}, where ω > i for all i ∈ N.
α0 := ⊥, αω := ⊤, αi+1 := ⊤ _ αi for i ∈ N.
Claim 5. [32, Fact 4.4(iii)] Every variable free IL formula is FPL0-equivalent to exactly
one αi.
One can prove the claim with the following case distinction [32, Fact 4.4(ii)].
2Two variable free IL formulas ϕ and ψ are FPL0-equivalent if for all states w in all FPL0 models M it
holds that M, w |=i ϕ ⇔ M, w |=i ψ. We denote this as ϕ ≡F ψ.
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If ϕ = ⊥, then ϕ ≡F α0.
If ϕ ≡F αa ∧ αb, then ϕ ≡F αmin{a,b}.
If ϕ ≡F αa ∨ αb, then ϕ ≡F αmax{a,b}.
If ϕ ≡F αa _ αb, then
{
ϕ ≡F αω if a ≤ b
ϕ ≡F αb+1 if a > b.
If ϕ ≡F αi, we call i the formula index of ϕ. In order to analyse the complexity of the
formula index computation, we define the following decision problem.
Problem: EqVformula
Input: 〈ϕ, i〉, where ϕ is a variable free IL formula and i ∈ N ∪ {ω}
Question: Is αi ≡F ϕ?
Claim 6. EqVformula is in LOGCFL.
Proof of Claim. From the case distinction above one can directly form a recursive algorithm.
If ϕ ≡F αi it holds that i = ω or i ≤ |ϕ|. (|ϕ| denotes the length of ϕ.) So every variable
value can be stored in logarithmic space. The algorithm walks recursively through the
formula and computes the formula index of every subformula once, hence running time is
polynomial. All information that are necessary for recursion can be stored on the stack.
Therefore the algorithm can be implemented on a polynomial time logspace machine that
uses an additional stack i.e. a LOGCFL-machine (even without using nondeterminism).
In the following we show that for model checking every FPL0 model can be reduced to
its longest path. Let M = (W,R) be an FPL0 model. (Note that we need no valuation
function because in FPL0 models variables are irrelevant.) Therefore we define a function
lpM : W → N that maps a state w to the length of the longest path in M starting in w.
lpM(w) :=


0, if ∄v ∈W : (w, v) ∈ R
max
(w,v)∈R
{lpM(v)} + 1, otherwise
Claim 7.
(1) Let M = (W,R) be an FPL0 model. For every αi and every state w ∈W it holds that
M, w |=i αi if and only if lpM(w) < i.
(2) The following problem is NL-complete: given an FPL0 model M, an integer n, and a
state w of M; does lpM(w) = n hold?
Proof of Claim. We prove (1) with induction on the formula index i. The cases i = 0 and
i = ω are clear. The induction step is shown by the following equivalences.
M, w |=i αi+1 (= ⊤ _ αi)
⇔ ∀s ∈W, (w, s) ∈ R :M, s |=i αi (semantics of _)
⇔ ∀s ∈W, (w, s) ∈ R : lpM(s) < i (induction hypothesis)
⇔ lpM(w) < i+ 1 (irreflexivity of M)
For (2) note that the problem for a given graph G, a node s of G and an integer n to decide
whether the longest path in G starting in s has the length n is NL-complete [13].
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Algorithm 1 FPL0 model checking algorithm.
Require: a variable free IL formula ϕ, an FPL0 model M, and a state w from M
1: guess nondeterministically a formula index i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |ϕ|} ∪ {ω}
2: if (ϕ, i) ∈ EqVformula then
3: guess nondeterministically an integer n < i
4: if lpM(w) = n then accept else reject
5: else reject
Algorithm 1 decides FPL0-KMc with the resources of LOGCFL. In the first two steps
we compute the formula index of ϕ. With Claim 6 it follows that these steps can be done
with the resources of LOGCFL. In the next steps the length of the longest path starting in
w is guessed and verified. The verification (Step 4) can be done with the resources of NL.
The correctness of Step 4 follows from Claim 5 and Claim 7. Altogether Algorithm 1 can be
implemented on a nondeterministic polynomial time machine with logarithmic space and
an additional stack. These are the resources of LOGCFL.
It is not known whether FPL0-KMc is LOGCFL-hard, too. We show NL as lower bound,
even for the implicational fragment.
Lemma 3.8. The model checking problem for FPL_0 is NL-hard.
Proof sketch. Claim 7 shows that in FPL0 only the depth of a model can be evaluated by a
formula. Accordingly, the αi formulas can be used to describe the maximal length of a path
through a model. This yields a reduction from the longest path problem in acyclic directed
graphs to FPL_0 -KMc. Let 〈G = (V,E), v ∈ V, n ∈ N〉 be an instance of the longest path
problem. Then it holds, that the longest path starting in v has the length n if and only
if G, v |=i αi+1 and G, v 6|=i αi. This follows from Claim 7(1). Since NL is closed under
complementation this is a correct reduction. For the NL-completeness of this longest path
problem see [13].
4. Lower bounds for modal logics
For all P-hard model checking problems for fragments of intuitionistic logics we obtain the
same lower bound for their modal companions.
Theorem 4.1. The model checking problem is P-hard for K40, PrL
→
1 , S4.2
→, K4→1 , and
S4→.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2 this follows from Theorems 3.5, 3.3, and 3.1.
From Theorem 3.6 and Lemma 2.2 we obtain that the model checking problem for
S4.22—the modal companion of KC2—is P-hard. Even though model checking for KC1 is
in NC1 [19], we can show that one variable suffices to make model checking P-hard for S4.2.
Theorem 4.2. The model checking problem for S4.21 is P-hard.
Proof. We show that AsAgap ≤logm S4.21-KMc. Since AsAgap is P-hard (Lemma 2.4), the
P-hardness of S4.21-KMc follows.
Let 〈G, s, t〉 be an instance of AsAgap, where G = (V∃ ∪ V∀, E) is a slice graph with
m slices, and V∃ = V1 ∪ V3 ∪ · · · ∪ Vm−1, and V∀ = V2 ∪ V4 ∪ · · · ∪ Vm. We construct a
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s
t
u t1 t2
top
a
a
all nodes in V4 satisfy a
all nodes in V2 satisfy a
Figure 6: The model MG as constructed in the proof of Theorem 4.2 for the ASAGAP
instance from Figure 3. Pseudo-transitive edges and reflexive edges are not drawn
for simplicity. The valuation marks the nodes (resp. the slices). The fat edges
indicate that apathG(s, t) holds.
Kripke model MG = (U,R, ξ) and a formula λ1 such that 〈G, s, t〉 ∈ AsAgap if and only
if 〈λ1,MG, s〉 ∈ S4.21-KMc. First, let Gt = (V,6) be the pseudo-transitive and reflexive
closure ofG. Second, we add two slices to Gt, namely Vm+1 := {u, t1, t2} and Vm+2 := {top}.
Third, we add the edges {(v, u) | v ∈ Vm} from every node in Vm to u, edges {(t, t1), (t, t2)}
from the goal node t ∈ Vm to t1 and to t2, and edges {(u, top), (t1, top), (t2, top)} from every
node in Vm+1 to top. Moreover, in slice Vm+1 we abstain from the rule that there are no
edges between different nodes in the same slice. We also add the edges {(t1, t2), (t2, t1)}
between t1 and t2 in both directions. Finally, we add pseudo-transitive edges V≤m−1×Vm+1
and V≤m × Vm+2, and reflexive edges to all nodes. Let the graph G
′ = (U,R) be the graph
obtained in this way. Then G′ is reflexive, transitive, and every node has an edge to top.
Therefore, G′ is a directed preorder.
In order to be able to find out in which slice a state is, we mark every even slice
V2, V4, . . . , Vm, Vm+2 with the variable a, and in slice Vm+1 the node t2 is marked with a.
This yields the valuation function ξ to be defined by ξ(a) := V2 ∪ V4 ∪ · · · ∪ Vm+2 ∪ {t2},
and completes the construction of the Kripke model MG := (U,R, ξ). Figure 6 shows an
example.
Let η := ¬a∧✸(a∧✸¬a). We will use that η is satisfied in t1, but it is not satisfied in
Vm ∪{u, t2, top}. The goal node t is the only node in slice Vm that has a successor (namely
t1), in which η is satisfied. We can estimate the slice to which a node belongs using the
following formulas δi. Let δm := ✸(¬η), and for i = m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1
δi :=
{
✸(¬a ∧ δi+1), if i is even,
✸( a ∧ δi+1), if i is odd.
Claim 8. Let x ∈ V≤m and i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Then MG, x |=m δi if and only if x ∈ V≤i.
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Proof of Claim. We proceed by induction on i = m,m − 1, . . . , 1. The base case i = m is
clear, since ¬η is satisfied in u and every state in V≤m has an edge to u. For the induction
step consider an arbitrary i < m. Let i be odd and and x ∈ V≤m. If MG, x |=m δi, then
x has a successor y with MG, y |=m a and MG, y |=m δi+1. By the induction hypothesis
we obtain y ∈ V≤i+1. If x 6= y, it follows by the properties of the slice graph that y is a
successor of x in a slice “higher” than that of x. The case x = y is not possible because
MG, x |=m ¬a and MG, y |=m a. Therefore x ∈ V≤i. For the other proof direction, take
any x ∈ V≤i. The formula δi is satisfied in x, if there exists a path of length m− i+1 from
x to u in (U,R), that goes through states that alternatingly satisfy a and ¬a. This means,
that no edge (v, v) appears on this path. Since every state in V≤m has a successor in the
subsequent slice, such a path exists, and therefore MG, x |=m δi. For even i, the proof is
similar.
The goal state t is the only state in Vm that satisfies ✸η. Using the δi formulas to
verify an upper bound for the slice of a state, we can now simulate the alternating graph
accessibility problem by the following formulas.
Let λm := a ∧✸η and for i = m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1
λi :=
{
¬a ∧✸(δi+1 ∧ λi+1), if i is odd,
a ∧ ✷(δi+1 → λi+1), if i is even.
Claim 9. For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and all x ∈ Vi holds: apathG(x, t) if and only ifMG, x |=m λi.
Proof of Claim. We prove the claim by induction on i and start with i = m. For all x ∈ Vm
holds MG, x |=m λm if and only if x = t, where the latter is the same as apathG(x, t).
For the induction step, consider an odd i < m first and let x ∈ Vi. We get the following
equivalences.
apathG(x, t)
⇔ ∃(x, y) ∈ E : y ∈ Vi+1 and apathG(y, t) (definition of apathG)
⇔ ∃(x, y) ∈ R :MG, y |=m δi+1 and MG, y |=m λi+1 (ind. hypoth., Claim 8)
⇔ MG, x |=m ¬a ∧✸(δi+1 ∧ λi+1) (= λi) (construction of MG)
Second, consider an even i < m, and let x ∈ Vi. The following equivalences hold.
apathG(x, t)
⇔ ∀(x, y) ∈ E : if y ∈ Vi+1 then apathG(y, t)
⇔ ∀(x, y) ∈ R : if MG, y |=m δi+1 then MG, y |=m λi+1
⇔ MG, x |=m a ∧ ✷(δi+1 → λi+1) (= λi)
The arguments for the equivalences are the same as above.
From Claim 9 it now follows that 〈G, s, t〉 ∈ AsAgap if and only if MG, s |=m λ1, i.e.
〈λ1,MG, s〉 ∈ S4.21-KMc. Since the construction of MG and λ1 from G can be computed
in logarithmic space, it follows that AsAgap ≤logm S4.21-KMc.
Note that the reduction in the proof of Theorem 4.2 is not suitable for intuitionistic
logics, since the constructed Kripke model lacks the monotonicity property of the variables.
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Moreover, in that proof we make extensive use of negation, that would have a very different
meaning in intuitionistic logics.
Clearly, the same lower bound holds for the fragment of S4 with one variable.
Corollary 4.3. The model checking problem for S41 is P-hard.
The P-hardness results for S4.21-KMc and S41-KMc are optimal since the model check-
ing problem for S40 is easy to solve. A formula without any variables is either satisfied by
every model w.r.t. S4 or it is satisfied by no model. This is because ✸⊤ (resp. ✷⊤) is
satisfied by every state in every model, and ✸⊥ (resp. ✷⊥) is satisfied by no state in every
model. Essentially, in order to evaluate a S40 formula in some model, the model and the
modal operators can be ignored and the remaining classical propositional formula can be
evaluated like a classical propositional formula—this problem is NC1-complete (see [3]).
Lemma 4.4. The model checking problem for S40 and for S4.20 are NC
1-complete.
According to Theorem 3.7 we show that the complexity of PrL0-KMc is below P, namely
PrL0-KMc ∈ AC
1. Therefore the P-hardness of PrL→1 -KMc is optimal in the sense that we
cannot save the variable.
Theorem 4.5. The model checking problem for PrL0 is in AC
1.
Proof. We show that every PrL0 model can be reduced to its longest path. Therefore
we define linear models3 Ln := ({0, 1, . . . , n}, >) and use the function lpM, that maps a
state to the length of the longest path in its model starting in this state (see the proof of
Theorem 3.7). (Note that we give no valuation function because in PrL0 models variables are
irrelevant.) Reinhardt [21] recently showed the upper bound AC1 for PrL0 model checking
restricted to linear models.
Claim 10. Let M = (W,R) be a PrL0 model, w ∈W , and ϕ a variable free ML formula.
Then it holds that M, w |=m ϕ if and only if LlpM(w), lpM(w) |=m ϕ.
Proof of Claim. We show this by induction on the construction ϕ. The case ϕ = ⊥ is clear.
In the induction step the case ϕ = α→ β is straightforward. Assume that ϕ = ✷α.
M, w |= ϕ (= ✷α)
⇔ ∀v ∈W, (w, v) ∈ R :M, v |=m α (semantics of ✷)
⇔ ∀v ∈W, (w, v) ∈ R : LlpM(v), lpM(v) |=m α (induction hypothesis)
⇔ ∀v ∈W, (w, v) ∈ R : LlpM(w), lpM(v) |=m α (LlpM(v) is a submodel of LlpM(w))
⇔ LlpM(w), lpM(w) |=m ✷α (= ϕ) (construction of LlpM(w))
For a PrL0 instance 〈ϕ,M, w〉 one can compute lpM(w) with the resources of NL (see [13]).
It can be decided whether 〈ϕ,LlpM(w), lpM(w)〉 ∈ PrL0-KMc with the resources of AC
1 [21].
With Claim 10 it holds that 〈ϕ,LlpM(w), lpM(w)〉 ∈ PrL0-KMc if and only if 〈ϕ,M, w〉 ∈
PrL0-KMc. Since NL ⊆ AC
1 it holds that PrL0-KMc ∈ AC
1.
3A frame M = (W,R) is linear if for every w1, w2 ∈ W (with w1 6= w2) it holds that either (w1, w2) ∈ R
or (w2, w1) ∈ R.
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It is not known whether AC1 also is the lower bound of PrL0-KMc. But from Lemmas 2.2
and 3.8, the lower bound NL follows, even for the strictly implicational fragment.
Lemma 4.6. The model checking problem for PrL→0 is NL-hard.
Even though we do not know the exact complexity of FPL0-KMc and PrL0-KMc, it
is a bit surprising that the LOGCFL upper bound we got for FPL0-KMc (Theorem 3.7) is
lower than the AC1 upper bound for PrL0-KMc (Theorem 4.5).
5. Conclusion
Now we are ready to state the P-completeness results for the model checking problems for
intuitionistic logics and their modal companions. Overviews are given in Figures 7 and 8.
We start with optimal results for intuitionistic logics.
Theorem 5.1. The model checking problem is P-complete for FPL_1 , KC2, IPC2, and
BPL0. These results are optimal with respect to the number of variables.
Proof. The upper bound from Theorem 2.1 carries over to all these fragments. The P-
hardness for FPL_1 comes from Theorem 3.3, for KC2 and IPC2 from Theorem 3.6 and for
BPL0 from Theorem 3.5. The optimality for FPL
_
1 -KMc follows from Theorem 3.7 where
we show that FPL0-KMc is in LOGCFL. For IPC2-KMc and KC2-KMc it follows from [19]
where AC1-completeness for IPC1-KMc and NC
1-completeness for KC1-KMc is shown.
For the following results the optimality is still open.
Theorem 5.2. The model checking problem is P-complete for KC_, IPC_, and BPL_1 .
Proof. The upper bound from Theorem 2.1 carries over to all these fragments. The P-
hardness for KC_ comes from Theorem 3.1, for IPC_ from Corollary 3.2, and for BPL_1
from Corollary 3.4.
It is known that the validity problem for IPC_ even without using ⊥ [25, 4, 28], for
FPL_ and BPL_ [4], and for IPC2, FPL1, and BPL0 [22] is PSPACE-complete. We show
for all these fragments that model checking is P-complete. Even more, for the implicational
fragments FPL_1 and BPL
_
1 with only one variable we reach P-completeness of model
checking. Notice that no PSPACE-hardness results for the validity problem for implicational
fragments with a bounded number of variables are known.
Our P-completeness results for KC_-KMc and IPC_-KMc hold also for the purely
implicational fragments, i.e. KC_ and IPC_ without using ⊥ (resp. negation). But what
happens if one bounds the number of variables in the implicational fragments? The model
checking problem for IPC_1 is NC
1-complete [19] but for IPC_i with i > 1 it is open whether
the complexity is below P. The fragments IPC_i have finitely many equivalence classes of
formulas and models [30, 8]. This equivalence class can be obtained with the resources
of NC1, using a straightforward extension of the Boolean formula evaluation algorithm of
Buss [3]. This might indicate an upper bound lower than P for the model checking problem.
But it is not clear how hard it is to obtain the equivalence class of a given model.
Another interesting open question is the complexity of BPL_0 -KMc. We expect the
P-completeness of BPL_1 -KMc to be optimal. But in contrast to IPC
_
i even BPL
_
0 has
infinitely many equivalence classes of formulas, because FPL_0 already has it [32]. For FPL0,
every equivalence class is represented by an implicational formula (see proof of Theorem 3.7).
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number of variables
unbounded 2 1 0
BPL P-complete_ P-complete
FPL P-complete_
in LOGCFL
NL-hard_
IPC P-complete_ P-complete AC1-complete[19] NC1-complete[19]
KC P-complete_ P-complete NC1-complete[19]
Figure 7: Complexity of the model checking problem for intuitionistic logics.
(The _ indicates that the result holds for the implicational fragment.)
For BPL_0 , it is clear that there are more equivalence classes, but it is open whether they
can easily be represented.
For the modal companions we conclude the following and start with the optimal results.
Theorem 5.3. The model checking problem is P-complete for PrL→1 , S4.21, S41, and K40.
These results are optimal with respect to the number of variables.
Proof. For all these fragments the upper bound comes from Theorem 2.1. The P-hardness
for PrL→1 , and K40 comes from Theorem 4.1, for S4.21 from Theorem 4.2, and for S41 from
Corollary 4.3. The optimality for PrL→1 -KMc follows from Theorem 4.5 where we show
PrL0-KMc ∈ AC
1. For S4.21-KMc and S41-KMc it follows from Lemma 4.4 where NC
1-
completeness for S4.20-KMc and S40-KMc is shown.
Notice that IPC1-KMc and KC1-KMc are the only cases where model checking for
intuitionistic logics is easier than for its modal companions S41-KMc and S4.21-KMc.
For the following results the optimality is still open.
Theorem 5.4. The model checking problem is P-complete for S4.2→, S4→, and K4→1 .
Proof. For all these fragments the upper bound comes from Theorem 2.1 and the P-hardness
comes from Theorem 4.1.
Completeness results for S4.2→-KMc and S4→-KMc with a bounded number of vari-
ables and for K4→0 are still open.
Another semantics for intuitionistic logics is the class of finite trees that are reflexive
and transitive. This is a subclass of the intuitionistic Kripke models we used and also sound
and complete for IPC. It is open whether the model checking problem for IPC over this
tree-semantics is P-hard or below P, and it also remains open for the other P-complete
model checking problems of this work.
Acknowledgements. The authors thank Vitezslav Svejdar for helpful discussions
about intuitionistic logic, and Thomas Schneider for his support. The authors specially
thank an anonymous referee of the Workshop on Reachability Problems 2010 for her/his
idea that led to Theorem 4.2. The authors like to thank also the anonymous referees of
LMCS for their helpful comments.
24 M. MUNDHENK AND F .WEISS
number of variables
unbounded 1 0
K P-complete→
K4 P-complete→ P-complete
PrL P-complete→
in AC1
NL-hard→
S4 P-complete→ P-complete NC1-complete
S4.2 P-complete→ P-complete NC1-complete
Figure 8: Complexity of the model checking problem for the modal companions.
(The → indicates that the result holds for the strictly implicational fragment.)
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Appendix A.
Theorem 3.6. The model checking problem for KC2 and for IPC2 is P-hard.
Proof. We show IPC_-KMc ≤logm KC2-KMc. Then P-hardness for KC2-KMc and IPC2-KMc
follows from Corollary 3.2. The construction is similar to the one given by Rybakov [22,
Theorem 4] for the PSPACE-completeness of the validity problem for IPC2. First of all we
construct formulas with two variables which can be used for replacing the variables in arbi-
trary IL formulas. We call them replacement formulas. Then we give generic models which
have for every replacement formula a unique maximal refuting state4. For a given instance
of IPC-KMc_ we transform the formula by replacing the variables with the replacement
formulas and as model we take the union of the given model and a suitable generic model.
This union eventually is a KC2 model.
The construction—especially the base of the inductive definition of the replacement
formulas—is very technical. Let p and q be the variables used in KC2. Figure 9 shows the
top of the generic model. There, one can see in which states the variables p and q are satisfied
(due to the valuation function of the model), and which are the maximal refuting states
of the formulas to be defined in the sequel. The essential idea is that every replacement
formula has exactly one state that is its maximal refuting state.
Construction of the replacement formulas. The following formulas are the base for the
inductive definition of the replacement formulas.
4 In M = (W,R, ξ) the state w refutes ϕ if M, w 6|=i ϕ. A state w ∈ W is a maximal refuting state of ϕ
if for all v ∈W \ {w} with (w, v) ∈ R it holds that M, v |=i ϕ.
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cp, q
d1
p d2
q d3
e1 e2 e3 e4
b13 b
1
2 b
1
1 a
1
3 a
1
2 a
1
1
δ1 δ2 δ3
ε1 ε2 ε3 ε4
β1
3
β1
2
β1
1
α1
3
α1
2
α1
1
Figure 9: This is the top of the generic model with states from W0 ∪ W1. Every state
is labelled below with the formula that it maximally refutes. (Transitive and
reflexive edges are not depicted.)
δ1 := p _ q δ2 := q _ p δ3 := p ∨ q
ε1 := δ2 _ (δ1 ∨ δ3) ε3 := δ1 _ (δ2 ∨ δ3)
ε2 := δ3 _ (δ1 ∨ δ2) ε4 := (ε1 ∧ ε2 ∧ ε3) _ (δ1 ∨ δ2 ∨ δ3)
Using these formulas, the first replacement formulas can be defined as follows.
α11 := (ε1 ∧ ε2) _ (ε3 ∨ ε4) β
1
1 := (ε2 ∧ ε3) _ (ε1 ∨ ε4)
α12 := (ε1 ∧ ε3) _ (ε2 ∨ ε4) β
1
2 := (ε2 ∧ ε4) _ (ε1 ∨ ε3)
α13 := (ε1 ∧ ε4) _ (ε2 ∨ ε3) β
1
3 := (ε3 ∧ ε4) _ (ε1 ∨ ε2)
We call the upper index the level. The formulas on the next levels will be defined inductively.
First we define n1 := 3 and nk+1 := |Pk| where Pk := {(x, y) | 2 ≤ x, y ≤ nk}. With
induction on k one can show that |Pk| = (nk − 1)
2. On level k we define αki and β
k
i for
i = 1, 2, . . . , nk. For the step from level k to level k+1 we need an encoding 〈· , ·〉k from Pk
to {1, 2, . . . , (nk − 1)
2} that is easy to compute and easy to decode. For example one can
use the following: 〈· , ·〉k maps (i, j) to (j− 1)+ (nk− 1) · (i− 2) for 2 ≤ i, j ≤ nk. For k ≥ 1
the inductive definition is as follows. Let i, j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , nk}.
αk+1〈i,j〉k := α
k
1 _
(
βk1 ∨ α
k
i ∨ β
k
j
)
βk+1〈i,j〉k := β
k
1 _
(
αk1 ∨ α
k
i ∨ β
k
j
)
Construction of the generic models. For t ≥ 1 we define the generic models MSt =
(W St , R
S
t , ξ
S).
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W0 :=
{
c, d1, d2, d3, e1, e2, e3, e4
}
Wk :=
{
aki , b
k
i | 1 ≤ i ≤ nk
}
for 1 ≤ k ≤ t
W St :=
t⋃
l=0
Wl
In the following we give RSt . The accessibility relation RTop of the first layers is shown in
Figure 9. (Certainly we use the transitive and reflexive closure of the depicted edges.) For
states from level ≥ 2 the accessibility relation will be defined as follows. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ t− 1.
Rak+1 :=
{
(ak+1〈i,j〉k , b
k
1), (a
k+1
〈i,j〉k
, aki ), (a
k+1
〈i,j〉k
, bkj ) | 2 ≤ i, j ≤ nk
}
Rbk+1 :=
{
(bk+1〈i,j〉k , a
k
1), (b
k+1
〈i,j〉k
, aki ), (b
k+1
〈i,j〉k
, bkj ) | 2 ≤ i, j ≤ nk
}
R′ := RTop ∪
t⋃
l=2
(Ral ∪R
b
l ).
In order to make the accessibility relation transitive, we add pseudo-transitive edges. Every
state in a level is connected to every state at least two levels below.
Tk := Wk ×
( k−2⋃
l=0
Wl
)
for k ≥ 2
T is the union of all pseudo-transitive edges.
T :=
t⋃
l=2
Tl
We define the accessibility relation RSt as follows.
RSt is the reflexive closure of T ∪R
′.
Figure 10 shows a cutout of MSt . The valuation function ξ
S is defined as follows (see
Figure 9).
ξS(p) := {c, d1}
ξS(q) := {c, d2}
The goal of the construction is that αki (resp. β
k
i ) is not satisfied exactly in the states that
see aki (resp. b
k
i ).
Claim 11. Let w be a state of MSt . Then for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t and i ≤ nk it holds that
MSt , w 6|=i α
k
i ⇔ (w, a
k
i ) ∈ R
S
t and M
S
t , w 6|=i β
k
i ⇔ (w, b
k
i ) ∈ R
S
t .
The proof can be proceeded by an induction on k (similar as [22, Lemma 5]). Hence for
every formula αki and β
k
i exists a unique maximal state in M
S
t that refutes this formula.
Reduction from IPC_ model checking problem. For a given instance 〈ϕ,M, w〉 of
IPC_-KMc we show how to translateM and ϕ intoM2—a model over two variables—and
ϕ2—a formula with two variables. Let ϕ be a formula with variables v1, v2, . . . , vm and
M = (W,R, ξ) a model. We choose the smallest k > 1 such that nk > m. To define ϕ
2 we
replace every occurrence of vi in ϕ by α
k
i ∨ β
k
i .
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aks b
k
s
bk−1
1
bk−1j a
k−1
i a
k−1
1
ak−2ℓ b
k−2
h b
k−2
1
. . . . . . . . .
Figure 10: This is a cutout of the levels k − 2, k − 1 and k of a generic model MSt where
s = 〈i, j〉k−1, i = 〈ℓ, h〉k−2, and k ≤ t. The dashed grey edges are the pseudo-
transitive edges. As we show in Claim 11 for example ak−1i is the maximal
refuting state for αk−1i . (Reflexive edges are not depicted.)
ϕ2 := ϕ[v1/α
k
1 ∨ β
k
1 ][v2/α
k
2 ∨ β
k
2 ] . . . [vm/α
k
m ∨ β
k
m]
Since k ≤ 1 + log(m) one can construct ϕ2 in logspace. We build the translation M2 =
(W 2, R2, ξ2) as a union of M and MSk .
W 2 := W ∪W Sk
The accessibility relation R2 is constructed such that if w /∈ ξ(vi), then (w, a
k
i ) ∈ R
2 and
(w, bki ) ∈ R
2. Hence w refutes αki ∨ β
k
i —the translation of vi.
Rξ :=
{
(w, aki ), (w, b
k
i ) | w ∈W \ ξ(vi)
}
∪
{
(w, akm+1), (w, b
k
m+1) | w ∈W
}
In order to make R2 transitive and give a logspace computable construction we connect
every state of M with every state in MS on level k − 1 and below.
Rtrans := W ×
k−1⋃
l=0
Wl
We define the accessibility relation R2 as follows.
R2 is the reflexive closure of RSk ∪R ∪Rξ ∪Rtrans.
As valuation function we use
ξ2 := ξS .
The valuation function ξ of M is simulated by the edges between M and MS from Rξ.
The model M2 is a KC2 model because for every state u ∈ W
2 it holds that (u, c) ∈ R2.
(The proof of the following claim bases on the proof of [22, Lemma 7].)
Claim 12. For all w ∈W it holds that M, w |=i ϕ if and only if M
2, w |=i ϕ
2.
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Proof of Claim. We prove this by induction on the construction of ϕ. For the initial step
let ϕ = vl be a variable with 1 ≤ l ≤ m, hence ϕ
2 = αkl ∨ β
k
l . If M, w 6|=i vl, then w is via
R2 (resp. Rξ) connected to a
k
l and b
k
l . With Claim 11 it follows that M
2, w 6|=i α
k
l ∨ β
k
l .
Now assume that M2, w 6|=i α
k
l ∨ β
k
l with w ∈W . Since
αkl = α
k−1
1 _
(
βk−11 ∨ α
k−1
i ∨ β
k−1
j
)
and
βkl = β
k−1
1 _
(
αk−11 ∨ α
k−1
i ∨ β
k−1
j
)
for 〈i, j〉k−1 = l it holds that there are some states w
′, w′′ ∈ W 2 with (w,w′) ∈ R2 and
(w,w′′) ∈ R2 and
M2, w′ |=i α
k−1
1 and M
2, w′ 6|=i β
k−1
1 ∨ α
k−1
i ∨ β
k−1
j and
M2, w′′ |=i β
k−1
1 and M
2, w′′ 6|=i α
k−1
1 ∨ α
k−1
i ∨ β
k−1
j .
From Claim 11 follows that M2, akm+1 6|=i β
k−1
1 and M
2, bkm+1 6|=i α
k−1
1 . Hence it follows
for every u ∈ W that M2, u 6|=i α
k−1
1 and M
2, u 6|=i β
k−1
1 because (u, a
k
m+1) ∈ R
2 and
(u, bkm+1) ∈ R
2. Therefore w′, w′′ ∈ W Sk . Furthermore note that w
′ and w′′ are in level k
of MSk because w
′ refutes αkl and w
′′ refutes βkl and with Claim 11 it follows that w
′ = akl
and w′′ = bkl . From (w, a
k
l ) ∈ R
2, (w, bkl ) ∈ R
2, and the construction of R2 it follows that
w /∈ ξ(vl). Hence M, w 6|=i vl.
For the induction step let ϕ = γ ⋆δ with ⋆ ∈ {∧,∨,_}. We show thatM2, w |=i (γ ⋆δ)
2
if and only if M, w |=i γ ⋆ δ. (Note that (γ ⋆ δ)
2 = γ2 ⋆ δ2.) For the cases that ⋆ = ∧ and
⋆ = ∨ this follows directly from the definition of the satisfaction relation |=i. Now consider
ϕ = γ _ δ and M, w 6|=i ϕ. Then there is some state w
′ ∈ W with M, w′ |=i γ and
M, w′ 6|=i δ. By induction hypothesis it follows that M
2, w′ |=i γ
2 and M2, w′ 6|=i δ
2.
Hence M2, w 6|=i ϕ
2. For the other proof direction let w ∈ W with M2, w 6|=i ϕ
2. Then
there is a w′ ∈ W 2 with (w,w′) ∈ R2 and M2, w′ |=i γ
2 and M2, w′ 6|=i δ
2. The formulas
αk1 ∨β
k
1 , α
k
2 ∨β
k
2 , . . . , α
k
m∨β
k
m are satisfied in every state of level k and below, because every
state in level k refutes exactly one αki respectively β
k
i formula. (The states below level k
satisfy all formulas on level k.) In δ2 every variable vi from δ is replaced by the disjunction
of an αki ∨ β
k
i . Hence δ
2 is satisfied in every state in W Sk . In order that w
′ refutes δ2, it
holds that w′ ∈ W . By induction hypothesis we obtain that M, w′ |=i γ and M, w
′ 6|=i δ.
From w,w′ ∈W and (w,w′) ∈ R2 it follows that (w,w′) ∈ R. Hence M, w 6|=i ϕ.
The reduction function is the mapping
〈ϕ,M, w〉 7−→ 〈ϕ2,M2, w〉
where 〈ϕ,M, w〉 is an instance of IPC_-KMc. Claim 12 shows that M, w |=i ϕ if and only
if M2, w |=i ϕ
2. It follows directly from the construction that this is a logspace reduction.
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